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Abstract—Electric Vehicles (EVs), as their penetration in-
creases, are not only challenging the sustainability of the power
grid, but also stimulating and promoting its upgrading. Indeed,
EVs can actively reinforce the development of the Smart Grid if
their charging processes are properly coordinated through two-
way communications, possibly benefiting all types of actors.
Because grid systems involve a large number of actors with
nonaligned objectives, we focus on the economic and incentive
aspects, where each actor behaves in its own interest. We indeed
believe that the market structure will directly impact the actors’
behaviors, and as a result the total benefits that the presence
of EVs can earn the society, hence the need for a careful
design. This survey provides an overview of economic models
considering unidirectional energy flows, but also bidirectional
energy flows, i.e., with EVs temporarily providing energy to the
grid. We describe and compare the main approaches, summarize
the requirements on the supporting communication systems, and
propose a classification to highlight the most important results
and lacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
D IMINISHING oil supply and increasing environmentalconcerns strongly motivate research efforts toward the
electrification of transportation, and technological advances
have fostered a rapid arrival of Electric Vehicles (EVs) in
the market. However, the charging of EVs has a tremen-
dous impact on the stakeholders in both the electricity and
transportation domains, such as electricity producers, power
grid operators, policy makers, retailers, and customers [1].
The EV load can drive electricity prices up [2], and alter
the producers’ generation portfolios, resulting in an increase
of CO2 emission [3]. Additionally, high penetration with un-
controlled charging threatens the sustainability of distribution
networks [4], [5]. For example, for an EV penetration of 25%,
almost 30% of network facilities would need to be upgraded,
while this ratio drops to 5% if the charging load can be shifted
to less crowded time periods [6]. These research works reach
a consensus that EV charging should be controlled to avoid
distribution congestion and higher peak-to-average ratios (i.e.,
demand sporadicity).
At the same time, the Power Grid is witnessing one of
its major evolutions since its conception at the beginning
of the past century. The classical structure of electricity
being produced in a small number of big, centralized, power
plants, and flowing through the transmission and distribution
networks to be consumed by end users is being challenged by
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the increasing penetration of renewable energy sources. The
possibility to communicate bidirectionally with all elements of
the grid–and as a consequence to achieve unprecedented levels
of monitoring and control–serves as a major technological
enabler of the new Smart Grid, allowing to accommodate
new types of demand and production sources as illustrated
in Figure 1. In this context, EVs impose new burdens due to
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Fig. 1. Actors and energy flows in the Smart Grid
the extra demands they constitute, but also open opportunities
thanks to the fact that their demands are relatively flexible,
and that their batteries can be temporarily used to support the
power grid: EVs can be active contributors in the smart grid
instead of passive consumers.
The important aspect stressed in this paper is that EVs
cannot be assumed to be directly coordinated by a central
entity controlling all charging processes. Indeed, EVs be-
long to individuals with specific preferences and constraints,
who would not relinquish control of the charging process
without being properly compensated. Instead, it is reasonable
to assume that they react selfishly to management schemes:
only when sufficient incentives are offered may EV owners
coordinate their charging time and power, i.e., reschedule
(directly or by giving some control to an external entity)
the charging process rather than recharging their batteries
within the shortest delay, which is convenient for them but
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2problematic in the grid operator perspective. Those incentives
can take several forms, from fixed rewards for letting the grid
control the charging, to auctions for energy, or through time-
varying prices set by grid operators.
Therefore, we think EV charging must be managed using
market mechanisms, where participants are assumed to have
different objectives. Hence an appropriate framework to study
the EV management schemes is that of economy, and more
precisely game theory [7], [8] which provides specific tools
to model and analyze the interactions among self-interested
actors.
This paper reviews the economy-driven schemes for EV
charging management proposed in the literature. While the
research on that topic is quite flourishing in the last years,
there is to our knowledge no work presenting a comprehen-
sive overview of the different approaches considered. This
paper classifies the existing models, highlights their main
assumptions and results, in order to compare them and identify
the most promising types of mechanisms together with the
directions that deserve further research.
EV charging management requires the support of a corre-
sponding communication structure. In some algorithms, infor-
mation is broadcasted from grid operators to EVs; bidirec-
tional unicast is sometimes needed to coordinate the charging
behaviors of specific EVs; finally EVs multicasting to charg-
ing stations (with or without station relaying) and stations
responding (by unicast, multicast or broadcast) are necessary
in reservation-based systems.
The importance of Information and Communication Tech-
nologies on the implementation of a so-called smart grid can
never be overemphasized [9], [10], and specially designed
communication systems for vehicles [11] are also relevant for
better scheduling the charging of EVs. Hence charging algo-
rithms and the corresponding communication systems should
be considered simultaneously to make the best of their eco-
nomical and environmental potentials. Existing works in the
literature provide general overviews of the requirements and
challenges; here we further investigate the economic properties
of the charging algorithms, but keep track of their prerequisites
on communication systems in terms of the volume and the
frequency of information exchanges.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II briefly discusses the technical environment of the
charging problem, introduces the economic vocabulary and
the desirable properties of an EV management scheme. The
next two sections present and classify the charging schemes
proposed in the literature to exploit the benefits and avoid
undesirable outcomes from EVs entering the grid ecosystem:
Section III focuses on unidirectional charging (energy only
goes from the grid to the EV batteries) while Section IV allows
bidirectional energy trading (the grid can also take energy
from the on-board EV batteries). Section V summarizes the
communication aspects of the schemes (type of exchanges,
volume and frequency), while Section VI provides a general
classification of all models and approaches, stressing their
limitations to highlight the need for further research in specific
directions. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. TECHNO-ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT OF EVS
A. Facilities for Electric Vehicle Charging
The term “Electric Vehicle” can refer to a broad range of
technologies. Generally speaking, the extension of this concept
covers all vehicles using electric motor(s) for propulsion, in-
cluding road and rail vehicles, surface and underwater vessels,
even electric aircrafts. Since our paper concerns the charging
management schemes and their impacts on the grid as well as
on their owners from an economic perspective, we narrow the
use of “Electric Vehicle” to mention a passenger car with a
battery that needs refills of electricity from external sources.
Battery Electric Vehicles (BEV) and Plug-in Hybrid Electric
Vehicles (PHEV) are two types of Plug-in Electric Vehicles
(PEV); PHEVs differ from BEVs in that the former have a
gasoline or diesel engine coexisting with an electric motor.
The economic mechanisms evoked in this paper mainly
differ in the way prices are defined, in the mobility models (if
any) of EVs, in the time scale considered, and in the directions
for power flows (from the grid to EVs, or both ways). The
specificities of EVs–being BEVs or PHEVs–do not play a
major role with regard to the economic aspects, and often
schemes are proposed that can be indifferently applicable to
each type of EV. Hence in this survey we present mechanisms
without always specifying the EV type; we do it when it has an
influence on the performance or applicability of the scheme.
Note that charging can be performed in diverse ways: EVs
can use an on-board or off-board charger [12], [13], or use
inductive charging while parked, thanks to Inductive Power
Transmission (IPT) technology [14], [15]. The ultimate expe-
rience of IPT is charging while in motion, of which a prototype
named On-Line Electric Vehicle (OLEV) has been designed in
the Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology [16].
Those cases being rare, we can consider in this paper that the
charging is done via a physical connection with an on-board
plug.
To insure safe electricity delivery to an EV from the source,
some particular EV Supply Equipment (EVSE) is needed,
which puts tight constraints on how EVs can be recharged
(or discharged if possible). The charging rate limit, battery
capacity and AC/DC conversion efficiency vary among the
different charging facilities and patterns. Two levels for AC
charging and three levels for DC charging are approved by the
SAE J1772 standard1, as shown in Table I, giving the estimated
time T needed to fully recharge a battery with 25kWh usable
pack size, starting from an initial State Of Charge (SOC)
of 20%. There are other charging standard proposals, which
TABLE I
CHARGING POWERS AND CORRESPONDING CHARGING DURATION T
UNDER THE SAE J1772 STANDARD
Level 1 Level 2
AC ∼ 1.9kW ∼ 19.2kW
T = 17h T = 1.2h
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
DC ∼ 36kW ∼ 90kW ∼ 240kW
T < 1h T < 20min T < 10min
1http://www.sae.org/smartgrid/chargingspeeds.pdf
3roughly correspond to the categories in Table I. For example
CHAdeMO2 falls into DC Level 2, and Tesla Supercharger
overlaps with DC Level 3.
At the other end of the wire stretching out from an EV
socket is a charging station. Figure 2 summarizes the main
categories in which we can divide the charging stations.
Individual stations capable of charging a single EV refer to
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Fig. 2. Classification of the charging facilities for EVs
those located in individual homes. Parking lots for EVs are
yet to be developed to their full potential: they contain many
individual EVSEs in physical proximity, belonging to the same
entity. Public EV parkings are open to any EV, while private
EV parkings provide access only to a specific fleet of EVs,
e.g., owned by a single company. On-road stations are relays
for EVs on long journeys, they can generally charge EVs at
the highest possible rate to minimize the delay.
Roadbed infrastructures for EVs are based on IPT tech-
nology [17]. We already witness roadbed infrastructures that
charge EVs at traffic intersections [18] or even without stop-
ping [19]. As some EVs can use other types of energy sources,
they can be replenished in refueling station, e.g. classical
petrol stations, compressed air stations, or battery-swapping
stations. Those charging solutions are out of the scope of
this paper due to the fact that they are either to some extent
overlapping with refueling problems for conventional cars, or
still in experimental stage.
B. Electric Vehicles – An enabler of the Smart Grid and a
participant in Electricity markets
The Smart Grid is an evolution of the Power Grid which is
expected to lead to a more efficient use of the grid resources,
for example with a reduced Peak-to-Average power con-
sumption ratio, faster repairs, self-healing and self-optimizing
possibilities, and full integration of renewable energy sources.
Demand Response (DR) is the possibility for the power grid
to alter the consumption patterns of end users; it can be im-
plemented through various mechanisms. DR was initially used
primarily toward large electricity consumers, but the transition
to the Smart Grid provides a paradigm shift, where every load,
no matter how small, can participate in a DR program. Energy
Storage is a key technology for the integration of Renewable
Energy Sources to the grid. Pumped-storage hydroelectricity
(PSH) accounts for 99% of the world bulk storage capacity3,
but there are physical limitations to the quantity of energy that
these types of storage can hold.
2http://www.chademo.com
3http://www.economist.com/node/21548495
Electric Vehicles can both participate in DR and serve as En-
ergy Storage facilities. They can respond to DR signals, such
as price variations or direct control messages by modulating
their power consumption, thus providing necessary flexibility
to the grid operator. In some cases, EVs can also inject
electricity back to the grid, thus serving as distributed energy
sources. These can be leveraged by the network operators to
improve renewable energy integration, to help self-healing or
to provide ancillary services, so as to reduce the dependency
on specialized equipments like diesel generators.
Generator
TSO/ISO
...
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Aggregator B
Prosumer
Aggregator D
Virtual Power Plant
EVSE
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EV fleet
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Fig. 3. Smart Grid Actors related to EV charging.
Figure 3 shows the major entities related to EV charging.
A Transmission System Operator [20] (TSO, in Europe)–or
in some contexts (in North America) an Independent System
Operator [21] (ISO)–is responsible for operating, ensuring the
maintenance of and, if necessary, developing the transmission
system in a given area. Consumers equipped with energy
sources that can deliver electricity to the distribution network
are called prosumers.
In a classical electricity market, end-users have contracts
with an electricity retailer, who buys the electricity produced
by generators. The transaction can be brokered via a bilateral
agreement or on a wholesale market. As the aggregated energy
consumption of a big region can be known with satisfactory
precision well in advance, contracts for buying the bulk of the
necessary electricity can be done a year or a month ahead on
the futures market. However, electricity consumption is heavily
dependent on the weather, thus requires a significant amount
of energy to be traded 24 hours in advance on the day-ahead
market. Finally, fine adjustments can be made up to an hour
ahead, which are traded on the intra-day market.
To match supply and demand for electricity instantaneously,
ISO/TSOs operate ancillary services markets (generally us-
ing auctions) where they purchase ancillary services from
generators and/or consumers who have the ability to vary
4their generation or consumption powers. ISO/TSOs also keep
a close watch on the efficiency and effectiveness of those
markets.
C. Dealing with self-interested actors
As elaborated before, EV charging involves many Smart
Grid actors, whose objectives are not necessarily aligned: EV
owners want to store enough energy as quickly as possible, and
at the lowest cost, whatever the impact on other EVs or on
generation costs; electricity producers and retailers are mainly
driven by net benefits; while ISOs generally aim to ensure the
most efficient use of resources and to maintain the supply-
demand balance.
Therefore, when designing mechanisms to decide alloca-
tions and prices paid, one has to anticipate that the actors
may try to play the system at their advantage. For example,
if decisions are made based on signals from users such as
their willingness-to-pay, the rules should ensure that reporting
untruthful values does not bring any gain to the corresponding
actors: such a property is called incentive compatibility.
More generally, an appropriate framework to study the
interactions among several decision-makers is that of game
theory [7]. A key notion is the Nash equilibrium, that is
an outcome (a decision made by each actor) such that no
actor can improve his individual payoff (utility) through an
unilateral move. As stable situations, Nash equilibria are often
considered to be the expected outcomes from interactions.
Hence many of the mechanisms described in this paper rely
on that notion.
Nash equilibria can be attained when all actors have perfect
knowledge of their opponents, their decision sets, and their
preferences. But those strong (and often unrealistic) conditions
are not necessary: in several cases the Nash equilibria can be
reached or approached via some limited information exchanges
among actors, or even without such exchanges but just by
trying out decisions and learning the best ones [22].
To summarize the EV charging problem setting, we recall
the relevant actors and set up the vocabulary as below:
• EV: A physical electric vehicle or its owner who will
generally be assumed to have a utility function (or ben-
efit), that represents his preferences. We will mostly use
the classical quasi-linear utility model [23]: for a given
price and energy allocation, the EV owner utility will be
the difference between the owner’s willingness-to-pay (or
valuation, i.e., the value of energy for him, expressed in
monetary units) and the price actually paid.
• Aggregator: An entity acting as an intermediary be-
tween the demand (retailers/users) and supply (genera-
tors, ISO/TSO or charging stations in some scenarios)
sides of the electricity market [24]. When an aggregator is
designed to be a representative of a group of EV owners,
its utility will be the aggregated user utility. Otherwise,
when it acts in its own interest as an intermediate energy
supplier, the measure of utility will similarly be the
difference between revenues (the monetary gains from
their clients) and costs. That difference is often called
benefit.
• EV charging station: The owner and/or operator of one
or several EVSEs in physical proximity, who allows EV
recharging and/or discharging with the aim of maximizing
revenue, but always under some physical constraints such
as local transformer capacity and standard recharging
power level.
• ISO (or TSO): An entity in charge of operating and
maintaining the transmission system in a given area. It
sets a constraint for the aggregated EV load according to
the transformer capacity, and purchases ancillary services
when necessary, in order to maintain the supply-demand
balance.
The aggregated utility of all users (here, EVs) is called
user welfare, and the aggregated utility of all suppliers (EV
charging stations or aggregator) is the supplier welfare. Social
welfare (=user welfare+supplier welfare) quantifies the global
value of the system for the society, and is computed as
the sum of all users’ valuations minus all costs (production,
transportation, if any). Note that money exchanges do not
appear in that measure, since they stay within the society.
To provide a guideline for future proposals, we list in
Table II the main questions raised by EV charging, and
summarize from our point of view, the criteria that make
a good charging management scheme. Also, we indicate in
which sections of this paper those points are addressed.
III. UNIDIRECTIONAL CHARGING MECHANISMS
In this section, we assume that energy can only go from
the grid to EV batteries. Electricity is expensive to store
and supply over the grid must match demand at all instants:
hence it is not possible for the grid to simply produce in
anticipation the power needed to satisfy the charging requests
that will occur from possibly many EVs over some periods
of time. Standby generation units can be swathed on, but
incur high costs, hence this is not a satisfying solution either.
Remark that the generation part is not the only limiting factor:
transmission networks and transformer station limits constitute
other bottlenecks. We therefore consider here the scenario
where several EVs are plugged-in for recharging, but the
available energy is not sufficient to feed them all (or producing
extra energy incurs high costs), so the aggregator is responsible
for allocating the scarce resource among the clients.
This section reviews the main economic approaches to
manage the (unidirectional) charging of EVs. We first describe
static approaches for energy sharing (where the objective and
decisions are based on a snapshot of the system regardless of
possible impacts of future variations), then extend the sharing
problem to dynamic scenarios (where the uncertainty of future
events is taken into account); we also consider the mobility
aspects of EVs (involving the choice of locations to charge,
and price/distance tradeoffs) and finally point out mechanisms
based on frequency regulation.
A. Static unidirectional recharging
1) Sharing energy efficiently among users: This subsection
is devoted to the energy allocation problem within one indi-
visible time slot, i.e., only the current demands are considered
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MAIN QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE EV CHARGING PROBLEM, AND DESIRABLE PROPERTIES
Question Criteria Examples In this paper
How to settle the conflict between EV demand and grid
capacity?
A desirable management scheme achieves higher EV
satisfaction and/or station revenue, meanwhile lowers the
grid burden.
[25]–[36] Section III-A1,
III-B1
How to coordinate the time-flexible EV demand scattered
in individual EVs to perform load shedding, peak shav-
ing, and to smooth renewable energy output?
A well designed pricing policy can incentivize partic-
ipants to shift their demands in a distributed manner,
without intrusively taking full control over their charging
processes.
[37]–[46] Section III-A2,
III-B3, IV-C
How could an EV owner reduce his/her electricity ex-
penses by paying the time-of-use electricity price?
A satisfying charging program is flexible in order to
respect EV owners’ travel plans, and is robust to price
uncertainty.
[47]–[52] Section IV-A
How to dispatch ancillary service tasks as well as the
associated revenue among EVs providing such services?
A good allocation satisfies some fairness properties in
terms of actor utilities.
[53]–[61] Section IV-B
How to organize the EV charging market between self-
interested EV owners and revenue-pursuing charging
stations?
A good mechanism should be incentive compatible and
achieve high (near-optimal) user/supplier/social welfare.
[31]–[33],
[62]–[64]
Section III-B
and there is no uncertainty considered about future events
(variations in supply and/or demand). We start with topology-
free models, where each EV’s consumption is constrained
by its charger and battery, then together with other EVs,
jointly curbed by the supply (typically, from their common
aggregator). Then we move on to topology based models,
where the throughput of the transformers further narrows the
feasible choices.
a) Sharing without topology-based constraints: Consider
a charging station with several plugged-in EVs demanding
electricity. How should the station dispatch the scarce avail-
able energy among them? We suppose here that there is no
discrimination among EVs caused by the topology of the (sub-
)grid they are connected to. Energy supply is considered as a
constant for models in [25], [26], and as a variable in [27],
[28].
Galus and Andersson [25] consider a large amount of
PHEVs connected to an energy hub which converts gas and
electricity to cover a commercial area’s heat and electricity
needs. Hence the total energy available to PHEVs is the
transferring limit of the hub, minus the commercial area’s un-
shiftable demand. Each PHEV is assumed to report truthfully
to the aggregator an individual (utility) parameter describing
its willingness-to-pay for one unit of energy, at every time
instant. This value depends on the gap between the current
SOC and its target, as well as the time left before its departure.
The aggregator then dispatches the available power, based on
those parameters collected from all plugged EVs, to maximize
the total (declared) value of energy for PHEVs, generally
feeding first the EVs with lower SOC and imminent departure.
A strong assumption made here is that EV owners do not try
to play the system by falsely declaring their utility parameters
to obtain higher utilities. The authors extend their work by
adding a network operator, in charge of a higher-level dispatch
of electricity and gas over all the aggregators [26], thus the
supply limit is simultaneously restricted to the capability of
the hub and the electricity and gas fed-in to an aggregator by
that network operator.
In contrast to [25] where energy supply is given as a con-
straint, Samadi et al. [27] let the aggregator decide the amount
of electricity to sell in order to maximize social welfare, that is
the aggregated benefit of all the self-interested users minus the
generation cost. They propose a distributed iterative algorithm
where the aggregator updates the unit energy price and each
user responds by updating his load (to the utility-maximizing
one under the present price) until convergence, at which point
energy allocations become effective. Here again, no strategic
behavior from users is assumed: they react myopically without
integrating the fact that their utilities depend only on the
converged outcome.
In Tushar et al.’s model [28], users are not only informed
of the price, but also of the total consumption limit. Each
user aims to maximize his utility function, while knowing
that if total demand exceeds the consumption limit, then none
will be allocated any electricity. This scenario is modeled
as a Stackelberg game [8] (also known as leader-follower
game), with the aggregator as the leader, setting prices so as
to maximize revenue; and EVs as the followers–price-takers
competing for resource through their demands. The leader sets
the price first, then the followers send their demand to an
intermediary manager, until the unique EV equilibrium for
that price is reached. The total consumption is then sent to
the leader, who updates the price to achieve a higher revenue;
that process being repeated until the revenue is maximized.
b) Sharing with topology-based constraints: The follow-
ing models share the assumption that EVs are connected at the
leaves of a tree-like distributed network. The objective of an
allocation can be efficiency [29] or fairness [30].
Maille´ and Tuffin [29] propose a solution to share resource
among self-interested users over a tree structure, through an
auction and with the objective of maximizing social welfare.
The mechanism was initially defined for bandwidth sharing in
telecommunication access networks, but is also applicable to
energy: an EV can send several bids to the auctioneer, each
with the form of a (unit price,quantity) pair; the auctioneer
then computes energy allocations and prices based on the
bids submitted by all EVs. The number of pairs one EV
can submit is chosen as a trade-off between efficiency and
(communication and computational) complexity. The mecha-
nism in [29] follows the principle of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanisms [65]–[67]; it incentivizes truthful bidding for the
users and guarantees efficient allocation–in the sense of user
welfare maximizing, since no costs are assumed here.
Rosenberg and Keshav [30] aim at finding a proportionally
6fair [68] sharing of a fixed amount of energy among users.
The algorithm consists in each link computing its congestion
or shadow price [69], and transmitting downwards the total
congestion price from the root of the tree (wherefrom en-
ergy is available) to users plugged at leaves; the latter then
demand their utility-maximizing amount after receiving the
price (assuming logarithmic utility functions). Such a method
converges to the proportionally fair allocations. Note that users
here are not aware of the links capacity limits, so their initial
demands might exceed them before reaching convergence, an
outcome not occurring in [28] where users sharing a link know
its capacity and act to avoid outstripping it.
c) Example: Now we illustrate some of those approaches
via a simple example.
Consider an aggregator having to allocate energy to two
users A and B with (non-decreasing) concave quadratic valua-
tion functions θ (indicating their willingness-to-pay for energy)
as expressed below:
θ(x) =
{
−ax2 + bx x ≤ b2a
b2
4a x >
b
2a ,
(1)
where x is the allocated energy and a, b are user-specific
parameters. Note that b2a is the maximum amount of energy
that the user wants, i.e., giving him more than this value
won’t increase his valuation. Users A and B differ in their
preferences: set aA = 0.5, aB = 1 (the respective values of
parameter a for player A and B) and bA = bB = 2. The
utility of each player is therefore the difference between his
valuation function, and the price he is charged (typically, px
with p denoting the unit price).
The aggregator acts as a representative of the EVs in [25],
[29], trying to maximize the aggregated user utility. Simi-
larly, in [30] the aggregator has also a user-based objective,
namely proportional fairness. In contrast, in [27], [28] he plays
“against” EV users, trying to maximize his revenue by setting
the unit price p. The supply constraint is a tight bound of C
in [28], while in [27] it is part of the decision variables, the
authors assume a cost of αC2 and consider C to be optimized
by the aggregator.
Table III shows the outcomes of those approaches for
our example. Remark that welfare-oriented approaches [25]
(and [29] if C2 ≥ C1 for example) lead to the same allocations
as the revenue-oriented ones [27], [28]. Those allocations
correspond to demands at the market price (the unit price
as which demand equals supply); indeed such allocations
are efficient, but also allow the aggregator to extract the
maximum surplus from users. Note however that the prices
paid are different: with VCG-based schemes, users are charged
below the market price, which can be interpreted as the cost
for having them reveal truthfully their valuation (while this
information-revealing aspect is not considered in [27], [28]).
For the models in [29], [30], that consider tree-like network
topologies, we take in our example the simple topology of
Figure 4, where C1 and C2 are capacity limits.
The objective in [30] is to achieve proportional fairness in
this setting, or equivalently, to maximize log xA+log xB under
the capacity constraints. Hence energy is shared equally if the
constraints allow it, as shown in Table III.
ISO Feeder(C1) Sub-feeder(C2)XA+XB≤ C1 XB≤ C2
User A User B
XA XB
Fig. 4. Capacity constraints: a simple tree topology.
2) Electricity sharing over several time slots: This subsec-
tion adds the dimension of time when scheduling EV charging.
A given time interval is divided into multiple time slots. Unlike
the previous subsection which treats as decision variables the
amount of electricity to be allocated among EVs, in this
subsection those variables now expand on time, becoming
vectors, to exploit the time flexibility of allocation. Therefore
the problem is to reshape the aggregated charging load curve
under constraints on the total energy transferred. We start with
models aiming at forming a flat load curve, then turn to those
that can shape the load into an arbitrary curve.
a) Flat charging curves: Time is discretized so a charg-
ing plan for an EV is a vector over slots, with the magnitudes
representing the charging rates. This rate takes discrete values
in [37], [46] and continuous values in [38].
Beaude, Lasaulce and Hennebel [37] slice one time period
(typically one day) into several slots (e.g., of length 30
minutes), and users choose when to start recharging their EVs
at a constant power level without interruption until reaching
their target SOCs. In other words, the charging demand is a
shiftable rectangle covering several slots. For the aggregator, a
supply increase causes a cost increase, and the cost function is
assumed to be continuously differentiable and strictly convex.
This cost is directly transferred through prices to users, who
are aware of this mechanism and want to choose the best
charge starting slot(s) to minimize their individual costs.
Let us illustrate the scheme through a simple example.
Suppose EV A (resp., B) needs a one-time-slot recharging
at the power of c. They can choose between slot 1 and slot
2. Denote the consumption profile for A (resp., B) in time
slots 1 and 2 with the vector [x1A x
2
A] (resp., [x
1
B x
2
B ]).
For a specific time slot, the aggregated load can be 2c, c,
or zero depending on user decisions, with respective costs
to the aggregator Cost(2c) > Cost(c) > Cost(0). This cost
is handed down to the users in the form of unit prices
p(Cost(2c)) > p(Cost(c)) > p(Cost(0)).
The game played among users is proved to be a potential
game [70], hence having pure Nash equilibria. Not all those
equilibria yield identical cost, but the authors prove that for an
infinite number of cars the equilibrium is unique and optimal.
In the same vein, Mohsenian-Rad et al. [38] use this
consumption-dependent electricity price to elicit users to vol-
untarily minimize the cost to the aggregator, and meanwhile
reduce the peak-to-average ratio of the load curve. The aggre-
gator sets a unit price linearly increasing in the consumption
level, so that the price paid is quadratic in the consumption.
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COMPARING MECHANISMS PROPOSED FOR STATIC SCENARIOS ON A TOY EXAMPLE
Aggregator objective Constraints Allocation xA Allocation xB
[25] max
xA,xB
θA(xA) + θB(xB) xA + xB ≤ C min(1, 2C/3) min(1/2, C/3)
[28] max
p
p(xA + xB) xA + xB ≤ C min(1, 2C/3) min(1/2, C/3)
[27] max
p,C
p(xA + xB)− αC2 xA + xB ≤ C 23C = 22+3α 13C = 12+3α
[29] max
xA,xB
θA(xA) + θB(xB) xA + xB ≤ C1, xB ≤ C2 min
(
1,max( 2C1
3
, C1 −min( 12 , C2))
)
min( 1
2
, C1
3
, C2)
[30] max
xA,xB
log xA + log xB xA + xB ≤ C1, xB ≤ C2 C1 −min(C1/2, C2) min(C1/2, C2)
Users have multiple independent appliances to manage, and
the constraint of non-stopping recharging in [37] is relaxed,
so higher flexility is offered: the charging rate is variable as
long as the total energy injected to one appliance meets the
client’s demand. When a day starts, each user first starts from
a random hourly consumption schedule and broadcasts it to
the rest of the community. Then, sequentially, users choose
their cost-minimizing schedules based on those received from
the others and their own daily needs. The authors prove that
the process converges, to a unique equilibrium where the
total charging cost is minimized. A desirable byproduct of
minimizing the cost is that the peak-to-average ratio of the
load curve is also significantly reduced: although the solutions
of these two problems are not identical, data analyses suggest
that they are close, since the lowest achievable peak-to-average
is only 0.05% lower than that achieved by the cost-minimizing
solution.
The convergence requires rounds of bi-directional commu-
nication between an EV and the aggregator. To accelerate the
procedure and achieve real-time responds, Binetti et al. [46]
propose to schedule one EV at a time, once it connects
to the grid. First the aggregator anticipates its load curve
for the following 24 hours, and lets the first arriving EV
know about this profile upon arrival; then the EV owner,
after a simple computation, decides when to start recharging
its EV at a constant yet self-defined power level, without
interruption. The computation complexity is low and can be
easily adapted to the circumstance where EVs arrive in a batch.
In [46] EV owners arrange their recharging with the aim of
minimizing the objective function of the aggregator, which is a
linear combination of the variance and peak of the aggregated
load profile, thus users are assumed altruistic; but a more
realistic approach should cover EV owner selfishness, hence
an incentive problem: how to define prices so that selfish users
behave in the best interest of the aggregator? We expect load-
dependent prices to lead to situations where the aggregator
cost is (at least approximately) minimized, as is done under
other assumptions in [37], [38].
b) Following an arbitrary curve: Merely flattening the
aggregated charging consumption of EVs is not always de-
sirable or sufficient, especially when EVs share the supply
system with other consumers. To flatten the overall demand
curve, the EV consumption should be adjusted according to the
external un-shiftable loads. Following are examples of guiding
EVs through the electricity price, so that their aggregated load
follows a predefined curve.
Ma, Callaway and Hiskens [39] model the behavior of self-
interested users as a noncooperative game, the objective of the
charging control being valley filling, i.e., shifting EV demand
to the valley hours of the non-EV load. A consumption-
dependent electricity price (a linear function of the ratio of
the real-time consumption to the generation capacity) elicits
users to defer their charging process toward the valley periods,
where prices hit the bottom. To avoid oscillations in user
behavior and ensure convergence, an extra fee is added to the
electricity price as a penalty on deviation from the population
average, so that users selfishly minimizing their costs converge
to a Nash equilibrium, which happens to be the socially opti-
mum outcome if all EVs have an identical charging deadline.
By adopting a different form of penalty, Gan, Topcu and
Low [40] prove the convergence to the optimum for EVs with
different deadlines. Moreover, they extend the algorithm so
that the aggregate load can follow any given profile, hence its
application goes beyond valley filling.
When real-time electricity prices can reflect the congestion
status, an EV would be contributing to valley-filling by sim-
ply following a cost-minimizing charging program. Franco,
Rider and Romero [36] seek a daily charging dispatch that
achieves cost minimization under hourly electricity prices.
They consider a specific distribution network where each node
brings a constraint about the consumption it can support. The
aggregator solves the problem in a centralized manner, i.e.
tries to postpone the shiftable EV loads to the time slots with
lower prices, while respecting the constraints and satisfying
EV demand. Similarly, Hu et al. [34] propose a centralized
cost-minimizing control mechanism based on predicted hourly
electricity prices, where the aggregator directly controls the
charging of each plugged EV, whose daily travel plan and
corresponding energy demand can be estimated day-ahead.
The aggregators sharing a distribution grid respond to hourly
congestion prices set by the ISO, by updating their previously
optimized EV recharging schedules. After convergence, the
ISO re-sets the price depending on its supply capacity, until the
overall energy consumption scheduled of all the aggregators
falls below this capacity. The authors recently extended this
work in [35], to the case of a tree-like distribution network
where EVs are plugged on the leaves.
3) Summary of Static unidirectional recharging: Table IV
summarizes the static approaches, differentiating them accord-
ing to the type of economic model considered, the controller’s
objective, and the main model constraints. The first group
( [25], [27], [28]) uses Stackelberg game models, with the
aggregator being the leader and EVs the followers. The leader
plays with the electricity price and followers adapt their
8consumption. This method can be used to achieve different
objectives, such as user welfare and social welfare, in an iter-
ative manner. When topology-based constraints are considered
( [29], [30]), EVs might not be aware of the whole topology
and/or constraints of each segment, but congestion information
at each node is handed down in the form of electricity prices.
This method can achieve proportional fairness among homoge-
neous cooperative users [30]. For heterogenous self-interested
users, each with a private utility function, the central controller
can organize an auction and dispatch energy efficiently among
bidders, respecting topology constraints [29].
All those charging schemes consider imposing
consumption-dependent electricity prices to cost-sensitive
users. While user demands are assumed elastic in schemes
studying a single time slot, they are considered fixed for those
designed for several time slots, the flexibility stemming from
the repartition of consumption over time to meet demand
constraints. That fixed-demand assumption is mathematically
convenient (in particular, the optimal load curve is unique
and computable), but it ignores the fact that EVs may benefit
from alternative energy sources and therefore have flexible
demand for grid power. So we encourage future research to
consider demand flexibility in both time and volume. This
complicates the analysis of the aggregator’s task (to choose
a load curve) and of the EV choices (among the different
sources), but we believe it is worth studying.
One inherent difficulty in distributed systems is conver-
gence. Although it is mathematically convenient to assume
arbitrarily variable charging rates between slots, batteries actu-
ally prefer stable charging rates. This hinders the convergence
to global optimum in atomic charging games, and results
in optimality being only achievable for an infinite number
of EVs [37]. Convergence can be guaranteed by modifying
user choices (e.g., through penalties as in [40]), but this must
translate into economic incentives by affecting utilities, hence
comes with a cost.
B. Dynamic models
1) Dealing with uncertainties about future events: All the
models described so far are static, in the sense that they
consider a time interval (be it one time slot or several) where
all the information needed to find the optimal power allocation
is already available (prices, users, constraints, etc.). But this
is not the case when actors have to commit for some future
slots before all relevant input information is available. For
example a user can optimize his current consumption based
on the present price (e.g., [26]), while knowing future price
variations would have enabled him to get an even better payoff;
similarly, an EV owner informed of the future electricity price
but unable to precisely predict its departure time can do no
better than minimizing its expected electricity cost [71]. A
robust optimization approach dealing with unknown future
prices is taken by Conejo, Morales and Baringo in [47], the
objective being to minimize the daily energy cost [72]. Other
types of unknown information are brought by the clients yet
to come, e.g., the quantity and elasticity of their demands. Dy-
namically adapting algorithms (also called online algorithms)
anticipating and adapting to new inputs must hence be defined
for such cross-slot optimization. We now turn our attention to
such approaches developed in the literature.
A simple version of a dynamic algorithm consists in repeat-
edly applying static algorithms, namely the ones in previous
subsections, each time some new information is available. This
leads to allocations that are optimal if time slots are indepen-
dent; but in the general case, things are more complicated, and
make specifically designed dynamic algorithms necessary. Let
us borrow an example from Gerding et al. [62] to illustrate
that.
Example 1: Consider two EV clients: Carol’s EV is going
to stay plugged-in for 2 time slots, while David leaves at the
end of the first time slot. Their marginal valuations of one
unit of energy are claimed to be [$10, $4] for Carol, and [$5]
for David, as shown in Table V. These values stand for the
maximum amount a user is willing to pay for each unit of
energy: Carol would like to pay $10 or less to buy the first
unit and $4 or less for the second, and one unit for $5 or less
is sufficient for David. Suppose we have one unit of energy
TABLE V
A DYNAMIC PROBLEM SETTING
Carol David
Plug-in time slots TC = {1, 2} TD = {1}
Marginal willingness-to-pay vC = [10, 4] vD = [5]
available at each time slot, and that our goal is to maximize
social welfare (i.e., the total user valuation for the allocated
energy). If users only report their current willingness-to-pay
but not their intended plug-in duration, treating the problem as
static leads to allocating the current unit to the user who values
it most. For our example, Carol would obtain the first time slot
(having the highest valuation), and would have no competitor
for the second time slot, hence obtaining it again, for a total
user benefit of $10 + $4 = $14. But this greedy allocation per
slot is not optimal: from Table V we remark that allocating
the first unit to David and the second to Carol yields a higher
total benefit of $15 = $5 + $10. To quantify the loss of value
due to limited information, a common measure is the ratio
of the objective value reached with the algorithm considered,
over the optimum value that could have been reached, had
all information been available. In our example, this efficiency
measure equals 14/15.
As evoked before, a possibility when facing new informa-
tion is to relaunch the decision search (in a myopic way, in the
sense that there is no attempt to account for future incoming
information). Going back to Example 1, this method would
achieve an efficiency of 1 if Carol and David truthfully report
their plug-in duration and willingness-to-pay, i.e., reveal all
the information in Table V. But if a third user Edith, with
marginal willingness-to-pay $6, enters the system at the second
time slot and leaves immediately after, that information would
trigger an allocation update, giving the first-slot unit to Carol
(if there is still a chance to do so) and the second one to
Edith. This allocation will again need to be adjusted if more
information arrives, e.g., saying that there will be two units of
energy for sale at the second time slot. Such a method should
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ECONOMIC APPROACHES FOR STATIC UNIDIRECTIONAL RECHARGING
Paper Model Aggregator objective Constraints
[25] Stackelberg game User welfare Fixed produced energy
[28] Stackelberg game Revenue Fixed produced energy
[27] Stackelberg game Revenue minus costs Quadratic cost for produced energy
[30] Cooperation Proportional fairness Fixed produced energyFixed transmission capacities
[29] Auction User welfare Fixed produced energyFixed transmission capacities
[37] Potential game Generation and delivery costs Fixed charging rate per EVNo interruption of charging
[38] Potential game Energy cost (and Peak-to-Average ratio) Fixed min and max consumption for appliances and EVs
[39] Non-cooperative game Energy cost (also valley filling) Fixed non-EV demand
[40] Cooperation Vally filling Fixed non-EV demand
yield higher welfare than repeating static algorithms per-slot
without adjusting according to newly revealed information,
but still does not guarantee to provide the best decisions
from the available information (that includes, e.g., probability
distributions for the expected future events).
We will henceforth call dynamic settings, situations where
decisions must be made over time, and not all future infor-
mation is available: clients dynamically enter and leave the
system, there is uncertainty about the set of feasible decisions
in the future [73], etc.
Finding efficient solutions for dynamic problems is already
complicated, but things can be worse when facing self-
interested actors who may be reluctant to reveal information
or could strategically report it, as pointed out before. For the
dynamic energy allocation problem, Gerding et al. [63] design
a two-sided auction mechanism in which truthful reports (from
the selling and buying parties) can be guaranteed by the
mechanism in two specific cases (where sellers are myopic,
or each buyer is interested in only one time slot). Otherwise,
relaxing the requirement of truthfulness may lead to higher
efficiency, by allowing the actors to strategize [63].
Note that very different models for user preferences are
considered in the aforementioned references. We therefore
believe there is a strong need to survey the current users’
economic interests, as well as the potential users’ expectations,
to build reasonable models and validate them.
2) Mobility-based charging management models: Let us
not forget that the primary function of EVs is transportation;
this characteristic makes mobility an unavoidable aspect to
consider for charging arrangement schemes; be it by simply
considering parking periods, or by covering complex mobility
plans of EV owners as is done here. First, we take the EV
owner point of view when selecting a charging station, then
the charging stations point of view through competition to
attract users.
a) Charging reservation: For EVs facing several options
to get energy, guided reservation can reduce the charging
delay [31], [32], and charging cost [33], [52].
Qin and Zhang [31] design a mechanism to recommend
charging stations to EVs traveling in a transportation network,
in order to minimize their overall queueing time before getting
recharged. For each on-road EV, only the stations on the
shortest path connecting its current location to its destination
can be candidates, so none of them will cause any detour.
Each on-road EV periodically sends a reservation request to
all reachable stations on the remaining part of its journey;
those stations estimate the waiting time for this EV, and the
one with the shortest waiting time estimation is reserved.
This reservation can be adjusted (through cancellation and
re-scheduling) at the next round, to dynamically follow the
optimal schedule. The authors prove a lower-bound of the
waiting time, and simulations show that the proposed dis-
tributed algorithm achieves a performance close to that bound.
Unlike [31] where the personal information (location and
destination) of each EV is revealed to all the potential stations,
Guo et al. [32] allow the users to keep these information;
even estimating the total time for charging at a specific station
(the sum of driving time, waiting time and charging time)
is performed by each EV. The estimation is based on the
situation of the EV itself and the information received from
the power system control center, the intelligent transportation
system center, and each charging station.
For an EV owner who is more sensitive to the energy cost
than to the time consumed, time-dependent electricity pricing
provides an opportunity to trade longer traveling and waiting
times for cost saving. Liu, Wu and Long [33] schedule the
charging jointly with the routing in that context. An algorithm
is designed to find the path as well as the charging quantity
at each station on it, so that the total electricity cost of the
journey is minimized. Particularly for a taxi driver, Yang et
al. [52] study the optimal charging problem for EV taxis
with time-varying service incomes and charging costs. They
aim at maximizing the long-term average profit of a driver
under the constraint of the SOC (state-of-charge) dynamics
of the EV battery. It is assumed that the expected revenue
from one service time slot and the expected electricity price
vary periodically. Those average values and their variation
cycles can be learnt by the taxi driver from past experience. At
each idle time slot (no passenger onboard), the taxi driver can
decide whether to service or to recharge. The authors provide
an algorithm and give a closed-form proof of its viability.
b) Station competition: Charging stations compete for
customers through prices [64], and may also try to learn the
pattern of customers in order to achieve higher revenues [63].
Garzas and Granados [64] assume that all users (informed
with the locations of the stations) first send charging requests
to all reachable stations, who then broadcast their prices to the
users. Finally, each user chooses the cheapest station among all
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accessible ones. Competition among stations is an oligopoly
game [74] on prices, where revenues are proportional to prices
and to market shares (the latter decreasing as price increases).
The cost for producing energy is assumed to follow a convex
function. Simulation results show that this pricing mechanism
provides stations with higher utility than the equilibrium
price of the Bertrand oligopoly game. Users benefit from the
price information, saving maximumly 11.5% with respect to
choosing the nearest station. Note that the energy prepared by
a station may be below the demand from the actually arrived
customers, but the authors claim that the probability of this
occurring is very low since users sent requests to many stations
before choosing where to recharge, so that stations are likely
to over-provision energy. Stations can then use the possibly
extra energy to serve customers coming without reservation.
The scheme in [63] described in Section III-B1 performs a
dispatching of clients to separate stations, more specifically,
each client is routed to a station where he is entitled with a
unit of energy at a time slot convenient to him (a <station,
slot> pair), through a two-sided auction organized by a central
controller. EVs can make a reservation by reporting their
willingness-to-pay matrix over all possible <station, slot>
pairs to the controller, while each station reports the costs of
the units of energy it can provide. Upon receiving the reports
from both sides, the central controller finds a <station, slot>
pair maximizing the difference (if positive) between the user’s
willingness-to-pay of this pair and its cost claimed by the
station.
Admitting that predicting EV mobility is hard, historical
travel surveys can give statistical insights. Since the results
on gasoline cars can be safely transplanted to EVs, data
sets can be easily found in [75], [76]. Information on user
mobility helps the charging stations to better price their energy
and organize reservations. Our literature survey shows a very
limited number of analytical results for economic models for
EV charging encompassing mobility due to the complexity
of the models, but the (numerical) results obtained so far
suggest this direction has the potential to yield significant
improvements.
3) The special case of (unidirectional) regulation service
and wind-balancing: Load variation, in the sense of supply-
demand balancing, has an effect which is equivalent to gen-
eration variation. So maneuverable EV charging can offer
regulation, in the same way as generation units in conventional
power grids. More precisely, when oversupply (resp., supply
shortage) occurs, regulation down (resp., up) can be realized
by raising up (resp., reducing) the recharging power of EVs.
Of course, this implies that the penetration rate of EVs is
sufficiently large for such scenarios to make sense: too few
EVs would not provide much service, since their batteries
would quickly be filled and/or the demand reduction they
could offer would be insufficient. Note that with respect to
the aforementioned scenarios, the purpose is no longer to
play with the tradeoff between EVs’ valuation for energy
and generators’ production costs, but to complete the task of
opposing frequency deviation and maintaining a satisfactory
frequency level. In this case, the commercial reward from
providing frequency regulation (the most expensive ancillary
service [77]) is potentially very attractive for EV owners. We
devote a separate subsection to unidirectional regulation here,
and address bidirectional regulation in Section IV-B.
Sortomme and El-Sharkawi [41] consider an aggregator
using EVs to provide regulation services while recharging their
batteries. Every time slot (typically, an hour), the aggregator
chooses a preferred charging rate for each EV, the actual
charging rate being subject to fluctuations around this value
due to regulation. The aggregator revenues stem from EV
owners (paying for charging their cars) and from the grid
(paying for carrying out regulation services). The aggregator’s
purpose can be to maximize its profit or to reduce the average
unit electricity price of users. For both purposes, the authors
highlight the need for efficient optimization for the system to
benefit both EVs and the aggregator, since simple heuristics
lead to significantly poor performance.
Bessa et al. [42] also consider an aggregator recharging
EVs while providing regulation services, and compare the
revenue of providing only downward regulation with that
of providing both downward and upward regulation. The
conclusion is that two-sided regulation is economically more
attractive when capacity payment (payed for keeping a certain
regulation capacity plugged, i.e., standing by for being occa-
sionally called upon) is offered, otherwise the uncertainty of
the parameters–day-ahead wholesale prices, regulation price,
vehicle mobility–plays greater roles, hence the importance of
accurate prediction.
Conceptually, regulation is just another type of allocation
problem, where the commodity is not electricity but a share
of regulation. So algorithms in Section III-A1 should also
work by replacing energy amounts with power increment or
decrement amounts. However:
1) The regulation service asks for an immediate response
(within seconds) and each cycle lasts for a short dura-
tion (a few minutes), which requires the algorithms to
converge fast enough.
2) Costs for EVs need to be better understood. EVs are
supposed to be energy-centric and price-sensitive–their
main purpose is to reach a desirable SOC at minimum
cost–, but providing regulation imposes extra costs due
to the negative effects that rapid power changes have
on batteries. Those effects are not directly reflected in
EVs’ energy valuation functions. Therefore, to dispatch
regulation in the same manner as energy, power fluctua-
tions need to be included into utility functions, together
with the price and resulting SOC. We did not find
representative models in this category for uni-directional
regulation, which leaves room for research.
3) In practice, regulation payment is settled on an hourly
basis (much larger than the operating cycle, which is a
few minutes), and it is a prerequisite for the regulation
provider to set aside a sufficiently large regulation capac-
ity (e.g., 0.1MW) and maintain its reliable connection to
the grid for at least one hour. Hence, if EVs cannot
commit to stay plugged-in that long, their marginal
contributions can not be readily obtained, and payment
sharing becomes complicated. The Shapley value [78]
can be applied in that case; we encourage further
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propositions based on revenue-sharing tools rather than
resource allocation for the specific context of regulation.
Due to the unpredictability of the regulation signal, the models
in Section III-A2 cannot be directly applied either, since
they consist in partitioning a flexible load to track a given
known profile. These features of the regulation service, and its
high profitability, make it a specific allocation problem worth
specific research effort.
By varying the charging rate, EVs can also help cope with
the intermittency of wind generation, as shown by Leterme et
al. [43]: wind farms can declare their next-day production in
the day-ahead market, based on predictions for generation and
EV availability. Then at every time slot (e.g., of duration 15
minutes) of the next day, it is a stochastic optimization problem
to decide the charging rate of the EVs, to minimize the current
production mismatch plus the expected mismatch for the rest
of the day.
IV. BIDIRECTIONAL ENERGY TRADING
Bidirectional energy trading refers to the cases where EVs
can not only buy electricity from the grid, but also sell it back
thanks to the Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) technology. This provides
the grid operator with an economical way to balance demand
and supply, relying on EV batteries as storage facilities or
energy buffers. As evoked previously with unidirectional en-
ergy flows, here too the EV penetration must be sufficient,
so that the contribution of EV batteries to the storage service
be significant at the grid scale. In order to make the storage
providing option attractive to self-interested EV owners, a
reasonable portion of the benefit should be shared with them.
One possibility of doing so is through bidirectional real-time
pricing, i.e., setting prices for both energy directions. If user
reactions to price signals follow some predictable patterns,
then carefully designed price schemes can help leverage the
great storage capacity scattered in individual EV batteries.
This section reviews the control mechanisms for bidirec-
tional energy trading. The first subsection introduces mod-
els characterizing behaviors of individual users facing time-
varying bidirectional electricity prices; then we turn our atten-
tion to schemes where EVs are treated as batteries (intermit-
tently) available to support the grid.
A. Individual arbitrage
Bidirectional electricity pricing (i.e., one price for buying
energy from the grid and another price for selling it back)
offers EVs the opportunity to arbitrage, i.e., to buy electricity
when prices are low and then wait for the grid to repurchase it
back at higher prices. Note that the energy transmission and/or
AC/DC conversion losses should then be considered. In order
for an EV to get a higher arbitrage revenue, the bidirectional
electricity prices play critical roles, together with the mobility
of the EV. The literature provides two ways of analysis of this
setting.
Hutson, Venayagamoorthy and Corzine [48] propose an
algorithm to carry out energy trading between an EV and
the grid, based on hourly market clearing price data from
California ISO (CAISO)4. The algorithm uses Binary Particle
Swarm Optimization to find most profitable buying and selling
times throughout a day from the EV owner point of view, while
guaranteeing a State-of-Charge (SOC) above requirements.
The model assumes that the market clearing price is known
in advance, a very strong assumption.
In the same vein, Liang et al. [49] consider a household
using a PHEV for daily commute; the householder wants to
minimize his energy cost by exchanging electricity with the
grid throughout the day, knowing that the electricity price is
the Time Of Use (TOU) price in Ontario5 as shown in Figure 5.
The difficulty lies in the (hardly foreseeable) mobility of the
Fig. 5. Ontario Electricity Time-of-use Price periods.
user. Numerical results indicate that with an estimation of
the statistics of the PHEV mobility and energy demand, the
proposed scheme performs closely to a scheme with perfect
knowledge of the PHEV mobility and energy demand informa-
tion (efficiency is close to 1). This scheme can then be adjusted
when congestion occurs among a group of households, e.g.,
their aggregated charging (discharging) rate exceeds the upper
bound of the power system. This high-level adjustment will
cause a deviation from the PHEVs’ optimal plans, and a cost
increase, so the authors further design an adjustment policy
such that the power system constraints are satisfied and the
incremental cost for PHEVs is minimized [51].
B. V2G for regulation services
Kempton and Letendre [79] proposed the first description
of the key concepts of Vehicle to Grid (V2G). Their analysis
shows that the passenger (combustion) vehicle fleet has ten
times the mechanical power of all current American’s electrical
generation equipment combined, and is idle most of the time.
So even with moderate penetration, EVs have the potential to
participate in the power market and it is also attractive for the
grid operators to let them do so. The authors then examine
the possibility and profitability of selling EV energy to the
grid. According to their estimations, the benefit to the grid
exceeds the cost to the vehicle owners. But this is assuming
EVs work as peak power plants, which is not only difficult for
them due to their on-board storage limitations [80], but also
4http://www.caiso.com/Pages/default.aspx
5http://www.ontarioenergyboard.ca/OEB/Consumers/Electricity/
Electricity+Prices
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not very financially attractive according to White and Zhang’s
analysis [81] or even not profitable at all when payment do
not compensate the battery degradation [82]. So Kempton and
Tomic´ [80] suggest regulation services as a more profitable
power market, which better exploits the strengths of EVs:
quick response time, low standby costs, and low capital cost
per kW. A case study of fleets of EVs participating in ancillary
services in four US regional regulation markets is provided
in [83], suggesting that with a few exceptions when the annual
market value of regulation was low, V2G power for regulation
services is profitable.
In the European market, a simulation based on real data,
done by Andersson et al. in [84], shows that the current
German regulating power market would yield significantly
higher profits to the PHEVs than the Swedish market. They
provide a SWOT (Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and
Threats) analysis of PHEVs as regulating power providers,
based on which they portray an ideal regulating power market
suited for PHEVs, featured by some key parameters. An
ideal regulation market for EVs should provide high capacity
payment, allow bidding regulation up and regulation down
separately, and have a relatively small bulk bidding size (i.e.,
1MW).
Considering how scattered and individually owned EVs can
participate in the regulation market, Quinn, Zimmerle, and
Bradley [53] stress the need for an aggregator, by comparing
a centralized architecture (direct communication between EVs
and the ISO) with an aggregative (tree-like) architecture—a 3-
layer structure involving the ISO, aggregator(s) and EVs. The
first reason is the relatively low reliability of an individual
EV, i.e., the probability of staying plugged-in for a given
duration: from 83.6% to 91.7% for a time duration of 1 hour,
which is incomparable with conventional regulation providers
such as natural gas turbines, which have a reliability of
98.89% [53]. Therefore an aggregator is needed to collect
a fleet of EVs so that their reliability be compatible with
the current regulation services system requirements. Beside
reliability, capacity requirements also call for aggregators: the
minimum contractible capacity set by the ISO (from 0.1MW
to 10MW in current electricity markets) are indeed way too
high for a single EV, due to the battery sizes and the limits of
recharging/discharging equipments. The aggregator can submit
bids to the ISO in the regulation service market, depending
on the number (and state) of the EVs it manages. During
regulation periods, each aggregator then receives a request
from the ISO for a certain amount of power (positive or
negative) below the contracted regulation capacity.
Admitting that aggregators are necessary for EVs to be
accepted in power markets, the questions arise of how much
regulation capacity an aggregator should bid for (normally
a bid consists of a capacity and a corresponding price, but
we consider only capacity here) to the ISO depending on
the number of EVs available and their expected departure
times, and how to dispatch the allocated regulation burden
among those EVs. Based on simulations, Kamboj, Decker
and Kempton [54] recommend to dispatch regulation up
(down) to EVs whose SOC are above (below) the average
level of all. The suggested bidding is proportional to the
available energy capacity (up and down, in kWh), divided by
the regulation duration. A scaling parameter quantifying the
aggregator degree of conservativeness, is used in the bidding
strategy to account for the tradeoff between the revenue and
the penalty for not meeting the requested power. The authors
evaluate this strategy based on real price signal from PJM, the
largest transmission operator in the world [55], and suggest
to share the revenue among EVs according to the Shapley
value [78], a policy with good incentive and fairness properties
but computationally difficult to implement. The data shows
that by providing regulation services for 15 hours a day, an EV
can expect to yield one hundred dollars a month of revenues,
given the current Regulation Market Clearing Prices.
Focusing on regulation dispatch among EVs, Escudero-
Garzas, Garcia-Armada and Seco-Granados [56] compare sev-
eral allocation schemes, assuming that the aggregator manages
a (sufficiently large) group of EVs available for a known time
period (i.e., no mobility is considered). Their first scheme max-
imizes social welfare, that is the total user payoff minus the
cost (due to battery degradation), but this may result in a high
dispersion among SOCs after regulation. The mechanism is
then improved by considering penalties for SOCs approaching
the boundaries of some acceptable zones. Maximizing this
modified social welfare results in maintaining the variance
level among EV SOCs to the one of their arrival time.
Additionally, the authors suggest a water-filling method (orig-
inally used in information theory to maximize the throughput
over parallel channels with different channel capacity [85]):
the variance among SOCs keeps decreasing, reaching zero,
but on the other hand the variance among user payoffs is
larger than that after the social welfare maximizing scheme
is applied. Another aggregator allocation scheme maximizing
social welfare is designed by Sun, Dong, and Liang [57], [58].
They adopt a general Lyapunov optimization framework and
develop a dynamic algorithm to maximize the expected user
welfare over an infinite time horizon, which is proven to be
asymptotically optimal and performs substantially better than a
greedy algorithm optimizing the per-slot system performance.
But EVs are not solely regulation providers, they have indi-
vidual travel plans. Specifically, consider an EV who wants to
charge itself to a target SOC before a predetermined departure
time, at minimum cost. Han, Han and Sezaki [50] suppose that
this user has two choices for each plugged-in hour: recharging,
or regulating. For the latter, he will be payed a price known
in advance for allowing the aggregator to charge or discharge
his battery: the uncertainty for the user lies in the direction
and amount of the regulation service, out of his control but
affecting his outcome. The proposed solution consists in the
user first making a utility-maximizing plan for the whole
plugged-in time–assuming null regulation–where utility is the
revenue from regulation service minus the charging cost and
a punishment based on the discrepancy between the actual
SOC on departure and the EV owner’s desire. Then, since the
regulation causes unpredictable (bounded) fluctuations of the
SOC, the user relaunches this algorithm again based on the
current SOC (hence a static solution to a dynamic problem, as
we pointed out in Subsection III-B1). This method is based on
the empirical observation that the time average of regulation
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requests is almost zero [86], hence the adjustments from the
initial plan remain small.
On the other hand, the aggregator between the ISO and EVs
can be a retailer of regulation services, who first contracts with
ISO, then outsources the service to EVs, by setting prices to
sell/buy energy to/from EVs to carry out the service; EVs,
based on their status and the prices offered by the aggregator,
decide whether or not to participate and how much energy
to provide or absorb. Wu, Mohsenian-Rad, and Huang model
the relation between the aggregator and EVs as Stackelberg
game when providing frequency regulation [59] and wind
power compensation [60]. They design a pricing mechanism
to elicit EVs to voluntarily carry out the services. Among
the limitations, let us remark that users in [59], [60] are
assumed homogenous, i.e., they have identical preferences. For
heterogenous users, a pricing design is provided by Gao et
al. [61]: heterogeneity lies in a willingness-to-pay parameter,
indicating the users’ possibly negative unit value (in monetary
unit per kWh) for (re)(dis)charging the battery. This parameter,
compared to the price provided by the aggregator, determines
the decision of each EV: upon receiving the regulation power
request from the ISO, the aggregator calculates the price so
that just enough power from the group of EVs is chosen,
taking into account that users are self-interested and rational.
The authors prove the existence of such an optimal price
when the distribution of the user parameters follows a regular
distribution [87]. If the aggregator knows this distribution,
it can easily calculate the optimal price and broadcast it
to users. Simulations show that the scheme leads to lower
prices than [59], hence benefiting the aggregator. When the
willingness-to-pay parameter distribution is unknown, the ag-
gregator can implement a learning algorithm to fix the optimal
price, using interactions with EVs.
C. V2G as storage for renewable energy
Wind farm and solar generation are vagary. This plays as a
barrier for renewable energy to be widely and efficiently used.
Indeed, the day-ahead market requires reliable production, and
mismatches between submitted bid and real-time injection are
sanctioned. EVs, with their on-board batteries, can provide
storage services through V2G technology, i.e., absorb the
surplus and release it when necessary, to maintain a stable
output level, or more specifically, to minimize the discrepancy
between the real-time output and the day-ahead bidding. This
can greatly help the development of wind energy according to
Kempton and Tomic´’s calculations [88], suggesting that V2G
could stabilize large-scale (one-half of US electricity) wind
power with 3% of the fleet dedicated to regulation for wind,
plus 8-38% of the fleet providing operating reserves or storage
for wind. In terms of expenses, Budischak et al. [89] estimate
that the electricity system can be powered 90% to 99.9% of
the time entirely on renewable electricity, at costs comparable
to today’s, if we optimize the mix of generation and storage
technologies including EV fleets.
To optimize generation and storage, one difficulty lies in
providing incentives to attract enough EVs to temperately
donate their batteries, and in designing schedules to make
the best of them. Vasirani et al. [44] model a Virtual Power
Plant (VPP) with EVs providing storage services, as shown in
Figure 6, where the reward to individual EVs is not monetary,
but consists in free electricity, proportional to the storage it
provides to the VPP. The VPP bids in the day-ahead market on
EV fleet
SUM
Fig. 6. A virtual power plant, with energy flows.
how much energy it is going to inject every hour for the next
day. These amounts are based on generation predictions, and
take into account the storage system. During the next day, the
VPP repeatedly searches for the optimal amount of energy to
store in (or to withdraw from) EV batteries every hour, as the
prediction gets more accurate over time. The feasibility of this
approach is confirmed through a realistic case-study, using real
wind power generation data, corresponding electricity market
prices and EVs’ characteristics.
Xie et al. [45] use a similar model to minimize the impact of
wind farm production variations. They compare two settings:
in the first one EVs cooperate with the wind farm by allowing
it to use their batteries as a buffer; in the second they just use
their batteries to provide frequency regulation to the grid and
make revenues, leaving the wind farm undergo the penalties
inherent to production variations. Numerical results show that
the penalty decrease imposed on the wind farm exceeds the
decrease of regulation revenue received by the EVs, leaving a
negotiation margin to benefit both sides.
V. COMMUNICATION ASPECTS
Before summarizing the economic properties of the mecha-
nisms proposed in the literature, we first stress the importance
of communication systems on their implementation. Informa-
tion enables decision making and optimization, this section
focuses on the content of information exchanges and their
frequency.
A. Information exchanges
For models that involve two types of actors (i.e., where
aggregators and stations are not distinguished and can be
referred to as energy vendors), Table VI presents the main
information exchanges that are necessary to implement the
schemes described before. Note that in [64] marked with a
dagger, the energy vendors are charging stations competing
on price to attract EVs; all other models consider a single
aggregator as energy vendor, thus research on competition
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TABLE VI
INFORMATION EXCHANGES FOR CHARGING SCHEMES WITH TWO TYPES OF ACTORS (EV AND ENERGY SELLERS)
References EVs to Energy vendor Energy vendor to EVs
[32] Estimated station availability and charging rate, traffic
situation, location
[25] Willingness-to-pay parameter Energy allocation
[64]† Charging request (multicast) Price offers (multicast)
[29] Bids (set of pairs unit price, quantity) Energy allocation and price
[62], [63] Willingness-to-pay vector or matrix Energy allocation or reservation
[31], [33] Travel plan, speed, consumption rate, route Charging plan ( to charge how much energy at which
station and at what time)
[27], [28], [30] ?Energy demand value ?Price
[37]–[40] ?Energy demand vector over discretized time ?Pricing rule, exogenous load or aggregated load of
competitors (this forms a penalty while EVs iterate)
[50] Willingness to offer regulation (binary decision) Capacity and energy prices
[59], [61] Regulation amount (amount of energy he would like to
buy or sell)
Regulation electricity price
[41], [42] Energy demand, charging rate limits, flexibility Direct control (for regulation)
among energy sellers is not abundant. We also highlight that
some mechanisms (marked with a star) involve a convergence
phase, hence the need for repeated exchanges (with low
latency to converge rapidly) before decisions can be made.
Grayed cells indicate that regulation services are provided
during the charging. References are ranked from the lightest
communication burden to the heaviest one.
Some algorithms consider 3 “layers” of actors, i.e. EV-
Aggregator-ISO or EV-Aggregator-Stations (shown with a
double dagger), with the information exchanged shown in
Table VII. The table does not include hardware-related infor-
mation such as energy transfer efficiency or battery capacity,
because they are not crucial for the economic performance of
the schemes and often do not need frequent updating, hence
have little impact on the communication system. Remark also
that there can be a tradeoff between communicating and stor-
ing: for example in [58], the users’ accumulating costs can be
either sent at every time slot, or recorded with a corresponding
user ID. Finally, note that not only information transmission
requires communication: so does information retrieval, such
as environmental information (wind speed, temperature) that
affect energy generation and its forecasting, and user travel
record that helps predicting their mobility.
B. Time granularity
Table VIII proposes a classification of the approaches pre-
sented before, according to the time scale at which they op-
erate. Algorithms that update every few seconds are designed
for immediate regulation allocation. Regulation requests are
sent frequently thus allocations should be computed rapidly.
On the other hand, systems reacting to events occurring over
time such as supply variations or EV requests can be expected
to run less frequently, say, once every few minutes on average.
Algorithms running roughly every hour are evoked by the
periodic revelation of new environment information such as
renewable energy generation or regulation bidding. Long term
planning such as day-ahead schedule is made upon precise
forecast.
Note that decision updates are driven by new information,
so the table also shows the frequency of information exchanges
in those algorithms.
VI. CLASSIFICATION OF APPROACHES AND RESEARCH
CHALLENGES
We summarize in Table IX the economic approaches de-
scribed in Section III and Section IV. Firstly the models
are classified into two categories, namely static and dynamic
ones, defined in Subsection III-B1. Static models deal with an
isolated time interval in which the performance is determined
by actions taken during this time, and optimal actions can
be found based on current state information. Contrarily, in a
dynamic model where system information varies over time,
actions should be updated based on state perturbations caused
by such sequential revelations, leading to dynamic optimiza-
tion methods [90], [91] as illustrated in Figure 7. As such, the
static setting could be seen as a special case where the state
is constant (but still depends on the action taken).
Objective:
Action:
Syst. State:
Syst. Inf.:
Static setting
(St = St+1)
Rt−1 Rt Rt+1
At−1 At At+1
· · · St−1 St St+1
It−1 It It+1
Fig. 7. Dynamic problem setting
We then distinguish the ways decision-makers interact:
optimization-based approaches correspond to the cases where
one central controller imposes his decisions about allocations
and/or prices, and is not influenced by any other actor’s
actions. Ideally, such a central controller has access to all
the information needed, thus the management problem reduces
to a classical optimization problem: the room for research is
therefore
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TABLE VII
INFORMATION EXCHANGES FOR CHARGING SCHEMES WITH A 3-LAYER SYSTEM (THE SEQUENTIALITY OF THE EXCHANGES DIFFER AMONG SCHEMES)
References EVs to Aggregator Aggregator to ISO (station‡) ISO (station‡) to Aggregator Aggregator to EVs
[26] Willingness-to-pay parameter Total energy consumption Load reduction signal if neces-
sary
Energy allocation
[63]‡ Willingness-to-pay vector or
matrix
User dispatch Cost matrix Energy allocation (reservation
of a time slot at a station)
[43] SOC Nothing Wind generation, and forecast-
ing error probability distribution
Charging power allocation
[56] SOC, acceptable SOC interval,
battery cost function
Regulation capacity Regulation signal (amount and
prices)
Regulation allocation
[57], [58] Utility and cost functions, SOC
and accumulated costs
Nothing Regulation signal (amount) Regulation allocation
[44], [45] SOC cost function Nothing generation information, elec-
tricity price and/or penalty price
Regulation allocation
TABLE VIII
TIME SCALE AT WHICH CHARGING MANAGEMENT OPERATES
Within Seconds Within minutes Within one Hour Day ahead
[58], [59], [61](Frequency regula-
tion signal);
[32] (Supply’s variation) [56],
[57] (Regulation settlement every
5 min) [25]–[30], [63], [64](The
arrival of supply or EV)
[31] (Charging reservation updat-
ing)
[62] (Willingness-to-pay of newly
arrived EVs)
[41], [50], [56] (Hourly settlement
of frequency regulation)
[43], [44] (Dynamic forecast of
wind generation)
[33], [37]–[40], [42](A plan for a
whole day is made on priori knowl-
edge of price or consumption);
• for static models, in improving the optimization methods
in terms of computational efficiency and/or approxima-
tion of the optimum;
• for dynamic models, in increasing the prediction accuracy
and designing algorithms that are robust to unpredictable
residuals.
In contrast, game-theoretic approaches refer to the cases
where interactions among several rational actors are con-
sidered: even if resources are still dispatched by a central
controller, the allocations are affected by other actors’ selfish
behaviors (e.g., bids sent by EVs). Here, static problems al-
ready lead to complex models, and even for those approaches,
analytical proofs of incentive-compatibility are only valid for
some very specific utility functions. While the need seems to
be for incentive compatible mechanisms in dynamic settings,
designing such schemes is still an open research question
in many cases. The difficulty often lies in the evolution of
knowledge and beliefs (and thus actions) of actors over time,
since the actions taken partly reveal one’s private information;
analyzing the equilibria of such games is extremely complex.
The last main criterion is related to the implementation type
of the schemes: revelation schemes imply that actors have to
exchange information (such as the willingness-to-pay), and can
choose strategically what to reveal, hence the importance of
properties such as incentive compatibility. On the opposite,
taˆtonnement schemes involve a convergence of allocations (and
often prices) through iterative methods.
A key aspect in several taˆtonnement-based mechanisms is
the convergence of the method: here the limits we found are
in the convergence speed (especially in dynamic settings: do
prices and allocations have time to converge before the setting
changes, say, before another EV arrives?). This is barely
addressed in the literature, where in addition convergence is
only established for some specific types of utility functions,
which need validation.
The classification highlights the need for game-theoretic
models in dynamic settings. While it is extremely difficult
to design incentive-compatible schemes in dynamic settings,
it seems capital to us to develop game-theoretic approaches,
even if based on taˆtonnement schemes.
VII. CONCLUSION
Electric vehicles, in addition to the prospect of being wholly
driven by renewable energy, are not only energy-efficient but
also cost-efficient [1], and emit less greenhouse gas than fossil-
fuel based transportation. The main risk they incur comes from
the negative impacts they may have on the grid, mostly caused
by uncontrolled recharging superimposing on other loads,
which exacerbates the grid aging. Coordinating recharging
and/or discharging not only alleviates those negative effects,
but can also help improve the grid by participating to services
such as frequency regulation and energy storage for (inter-
mittent) renewable energy generation. These opportunities can
be realized in the Smart Grid realm, so EVs and Smart Grid
are mutually reinforcing. From the EV owner’s point of view,
organized recharging and discharging offer the possibility to
reduce energy costs or even generate profits.
This paper surveys the charging managements schemes of
the literature, with a focus on economy-driven mechanisms.
The proposed models, often based on optimization and/or
game-theory tools, range from the simple sharing of a given
energy amount among several customers (a classical problem)
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TABLE IX
A CLASSIFICATION OF ECONOMIC SCHEMES FOR EV CHARGING. A DIAMOND MARK INDICATES PAPERS CONSIDERING PHEVS (WHICH CAN USE
FOSSILE FUEL) RATHER THAN BEVS (WHICH CAN ONLY USE THE ELECTRIC ENERGY STORED IN THEIR BATTERY).
Optimization-based approaches Game-theoretic approaches
Static [26]

Heuristic demand curtailment per slot
[36], [42] [48] [52] Optimization made on pre-
diction of unknown future parameters
[56]
Fair allocation of regulation per slot
Revelation
schemes
[25]
Auction based on willingness-to-pay, incentive com-
patibility assumed
[29]
Auction based on willingness-to-pay, incentive com-
patiblility proved
Taˆtonnement
schemes
[27], [28], [30], [34], [35], [37], [38], [40], [39]
Stackelberg game between aggregator and EVs,
leader is not omniscient (i.e. unaware of user utility
function)
[64]
Oligopoly game among charging stations
Dynamic [49]
, [51]
EV mobility is modeled as a Markov chain
[41], [44], [45], [43]
Forecast accuracies increase as time approaching
[31], [46], [50]
Dynamically relaunch a static algorithm
Revelation
schemes
[62]
Incentive compatible for dynamically arriving
clients.
Taˆtonnement
schemes
[32]
Dynamically relaunch a static algorithm
[61], [63]
Sellers learn users’ willingness-to-pay dynamically
to more complex settings covering aspects such as uncertainty
about future events, user mobility constraints, charging station
positions, and new grid services like regulation. While some
interesting mechanisms have been proposed, and perform
well on simulation scenarios, we observed a quite limited
amount of analytical results due to the increasing complexity
of the settings (large number of actors, specific constraints
of distribution networks and EV batteries) and the economic
constraints (nonalignment of actors’ objectives). Hence we
think that further research is needed to better understand the
key principles to apply when designing charging management
schemes.
The present survey highlights the potential of V2G tech-
nology to benefit both EV owners and the grid operator, but
also the difficulty of distributing those gains to EV owners to
incentivize them to cooperate with the grid operator. From the
literature review, we witness that management of EV charging
processes in smart grids has attracted researchers from diverse
domains, and we envision more effort will be devoted to this
topic. Several research perspectives are promising from our
point of view. Firstly, we consider the trend is pointing at
Microgrids [92], which are systems with multiple distributed
generators and consumers that can switch between Island
mode and connected mode: the presence of EVs is likely
to increase the autonomy of such systems. Another research
perspective regards the charging management of fleets of
EVs, from a fleet owner perspective. For example, with the
technology of driverless cars getting matured, driverless taxi
fleet may emerge, offering new possibilities for charging (and
service providing) management.
Electric vehicles is an extremely fast-developing field. Tech-
nology innovations can reform charging management schemes,
for example the roadbed infrastructure would enable charging
in motion, which would greatly reduce the reliance on battery
capacity and change the understanding (and modeling) of
“plug-in” time. Economic models for such scenarios are still
to be defined.
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